Iraq Condemns the Attacks on US Bases. Iraq Also Authorized Them.

Six US soldiers died when rockets struck Camp Buehring in Kuwait on March 4, launched from Iraqi territory. Kata'ib Hezbollah claimed the attack. Iraq's Prime Minister Sudani condemned it as "a terrorist act that violates Iraqi sovereignty." Two days later, Iraq's National Security Council authorized the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) to "take all necessary measures to respond to attacks on Iraqi territory," language that the PMF interpreted as authorization to conduct offensive operations against US positions they deemed threatening.

The government that condemned the attack authorized the attackers. Same week. Same officials.

This is the nation-state as fiction in its purest form. Iraq's government simultaneously condemns militia attacks on US bases AND authorizes the militia framework that conducts them. The contradiction isn't a bug. It's the operating system of a state captured by competing power centers, each with its own external patron, its own military capability, and its own interpretation of what "Iraqi sovereignty" means.

Who is fighting whom in Iraq?

The PMF is not a single organization. It is an umbrella containing approximately 50+ militia groups with wildly different loyalties. The ones attacking US bases:

Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH): the most capable, most directly IRGC-controlled faction. Founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (killed alongside Soleimani in 2020). Current leadership maintains direct IRGC communication channels. KH has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US since 2009. It operates as an IRGC extension on Iraqi soil.

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): led by Qais al-Khazali, a former student of Muqtada al-Sadr who split from the Sadrist movement. AAH has its own political party and parliamentary seats. It is simultaneously a militia, a political party, and an IRGC client.

Harakat al-Nujaba: explicitly committed to the "Islamic resistance" model, with fighters deployed to Syria alongside the IRGC. Declared war on US forces on Day 1.

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS): smaller but aggressive, with confirmed cross-border rocket attacks from Iraqi territory.

And then there's Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr, who commands the largest Shia political movement in Iraq and controls the Saraya al-Salam militia, is against attacking US forces. His position: Iraq should not be a proxy battlefield. The split between Sadr's neutralism and KH/AAH's belligerence is the most important intra-Shia dynamic of the war.

The Embassy Baghdad helipad was hit on March 6 (the third attack on the compound). Two KH operatives were killed in an Israeli or US strike at Jurf al-Sakher, a KH stronghold south of Baghdad. The tit-for-tat is continuous.

What about Al-Hol?

The ISIS dimension is the story nobody wants to connect to the Iran war. Al-Hol camp in northeast Syria held approximately 50,000+ detainees (family members of ISIS fighters, including 20,000+ non-Syrian/non-Iraqi nationals). Security at Al-Hol depended on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led force that is now under pressure as Kurdish fighters are redeployed and attention shifts.

Reports indicate 20,000+ have escaped or been released from Al-Hol and similar camps since the war began. ISIS has approximately 10,000 active fighters across Syria and Iraq, per CENTCOM's pre-war assessment. Daily attacks in Iraq's Diyala, Kirkuk, and Saladin provinces have increased. Iraq's counter-terrorism service is stretched between PMF management and ISIS resurgence.

A senior US counterterrorism official described it as a "new phase" of ISIS reconstitution. The Iran war is consuming the intelligence and military resources that contained ISIS. The containment is weakening. The implications extend beyond this war.

Could the US be forced out of Iraq?

The Iraqi parliament passed a resolution demanding US withdrawal in January 2020 (after the Soleimani strike). The resolution was non-binding and never implemented. The current government has not renewed the demand because Sudani needs US air support against ISIS and US economic leverage (dollar-denominated oil revenue flows through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).

But the calculus is changing. Every PMF attack on US bases increases domestic pressure to either expel the US or definitively break with the PMF. Sudani can't do either. Expelling the US empowers the PMF and weakens ISIS containment. Breaking with the PMF risks civil war. So he condemns attacks on Monday and authorizes the PMF on Tuesday. And the fiction continues.

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FAQ

How many US troops are in Iraq?

Approximately 2,500, officially in an "advise and assist" role. Major bases include Al Asad Air Base (Anbar), Erbil (Kurdistan Region), and Baghdad's Green Zone. Additional special operations forces operate from undisclosed locations. The exact number fluctuates and is higher during the current crisis due to rotational deployments.

Is Iran controlling the PMF directly?

KH and Nujaba take direct IRGC orders. AAH has more autonomy but coordinates with IRGC. Sadr's faction does not take IRGC orders and actively opposes attacks on US forces. The PMF is not a monolith. Iran controls perhaps 60-70% of its combat capability through the factions listed above. The remaining 30-40% either follow Sadr's line or operate independently.

Could ISIS actually reconstitute?

Not to 2014-level territorial control. But ISIS doesn't need territory to be dangerous. A sustained insurgency campaign (bombings, assassinations, prison breaks) is already underway. The 10,000 active fighters plus 20,000+ escaped camp detainees represent a force capable of destabilizing provinces for years. The Iran war's diversion of CT resources is the best thing that happened to ISIS since the fall of Baghouz.