Ukraine Is Losing Worse Than You Think, and the Iran War Made It Happen

Ukraine confirmed withdrawal from Sudzha on March 16. The retreat was, per BBC interviews with Ukrainian soldiers, "disorderly and catastrophic." North Korean soldiers were heavily involved in retaking the town. The Kursk salient, which peaked at 1,300 square kilometers in August 2024 and was down to less than 290 when we started tracking in early March, is dead as a bargaining chip.

Seven months of occupation. Thousands of casualties. A strategic gamble that was supposed to force Russia to divert forces from Donbas and give Ukraine leverage at the negotiating table. It produced neither. The territory is gone. The leverage evaporated. The soldiers who held it are being redeployed to the Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive, which is the one front where Ukraine is actually advancing.

That's the bad news. It gets worse before it gets better.

What's Russia doing with the Fortress Belt?

ISW assessed on March 21-22 that Russia has begun its anticipated spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine's Fortress Belt, the defensive line running through Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka in Donetsk Oblast. This is the campaign that defines 2026.

A March 19 regiment-sized mechanized assault tells the story: 500+ personnel, 28 armored vehicles, 100+ motorized vehicles pushed toward the Belt. Within four hours, Ukraine stopped all advances. Russian losses: 405 casualties out of 500+, an 81% casualty rate. Eighty-four motor vehicles destroyed. Eleven IFVs and APCs. Three tanks. 160+ drones.

ISW's assessment: Russia is "unlikely to seize the Fortress Belt in 2026" but will make tactical gains at the margins. The character of the war is unchanged: attrition, not breakthrough. But attrition at 81% casualty rates raises the question of how many more regiment-sized assaults Russia can absorb before the manpower deficit that crossed the "losses exceed recruitment" threshold becomes operationally binding.

The answer, based on NWF depletion rates and recruitment economics: 12-18 months. Russia's war economy is sustainable until approximately end of 2027 under current conditions. The Iran war's oil windfall ($6.9 billion in additional fossil fuel revenue in the first two weeks alone, Urals crude now selling above Brent in India at $121.65 per barrel) is paradoxically extending that runway.

How did 800 Patriots change the air defense calculus?

More than 800 Patriot interceptors were consumed in the Middle East in the first days of the Iran war, more than Ukraine received in the entire four-year war since 2022. US annual PAC-3 production (~620 in 2025) cannot supply both theaters simultaneously. THAAD batteries have been moved from South Korea to the Gulf. The Pacific is exposed.

Ukraine's air defense situation has materially deteriorated. Massive Russian strikes exploited the gap: March 7 (480 drones + 29 missiles), March 14 (430 drones + 68 missiles, 184 facilities damaged), March 22 (~139 drones), March 24 (390+ drones + 34 missiles + 7 ballistic missiles). The overall cruise missile intercept rate hovers around 33%. Eighty percent of Ukraine remains without ballistic missile defense coverage.

Germany confirmed 35 Patriot missiles for Ukraine, a gesture, not a solution. Ukraine ordered 18 new IRIS-T systems from Diehl Defence. These and NASAMS show near-100% effectiveness but are medium-range. They can't stop the Oreshnik or Iskander-class threats that Russia deploys against strategic targets.

Russia launched its largest single drone attack of the war on March 24: 800+ drones across a 21-hour period targeting Lviv, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Vinnytsia, Dnipro, Odessa, and frontline regions. A maternity hospital was hit in Ivano-Frankivsk. Two killed, four wounded including a six-year-old.

Why is Zelensky's approval at 62%?

This is the number that surprised us most when our research agents returned it, because our earlier data had him at 20.3%. That figure turned out to be hypothetical presidential election polling, not approval rating. The actual KIIS poll (March 1-8, published March 18) shows 62% approval, up from 53% in February. Thirty-two percent disapprove.

The Iran war boosted Zelensky. Not because Ukrainians support it. They don't. Because it gave him the single most valuable diplomatic card he's played since 2022: the drone-for-Patriot gambit.

Eleven countries, including the US, Gulf states, and multiple European nations, have requested Ukrainian interceptor drones. Ukrainian drone warfare teams are now on the ground in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Jordan. The drones cost $1,000-2,500 each. A Patriot costs $4 million. Gulf states were using up to eight Patriots per target before Ukrainian advisers arrived to show them cheaper alternatives.

A senior Ukrainian Air Force officer told The Times he was "surprised" that Gulf countries spent millions per intercept on cheap drones that Ukraine handles with a fraction of the cost. The relationship has inverted: Ukraine is no longer the supplicant begging for Western weapons. Ukraine is the expert teaching the world's richest countries how to fight.

This repositioning is the most consequential diplomatic development for Ukraine since the full-scale invasion. It creates dependencies that translate into political leverage. Countries that rely on Ukrainian counter-drone expertise have a vested interest in Ukraine's survival. The gambit transforms Ukraine from aid recipient to indispensable partner.

What did Russia offer for Ukraine?

The intelligence-sharing dimension is confirmed and escalating. Russia is providing satellite imagery, real-time US warship positions, and advanced drone tactical guidance to Iran, confirmed by WaPo, CNN, NBC, CBS, and ABC, with CIA Director Ratcliffe confirming publicly.

But the real bombshell came from Politico on March 20: Kremlin envoy Dmitriev proposed to Witkoff and Kushner in Miami that Russia would stop sharing US positions with Iran IF the US stopped providing intelligence to Ukraine. Washington rejected the offer. Dmitriev denied it.

This confirms Russia is treating intelligence sharing with Iran as a bargaining chip in the Ukraine negotiations, not just operational support for Tehran. The two wars are now formally linked in Russia's strategic calculus. European allies are "deeply alarmed" that the Witkoff-Dmitriev channel may be exploring bilateral US-Russia deals that sideline European partners.

Peace talks between the US, Russia, and Ukraine are on "situational pause," frozen by the Iran war. The 20-point framework from December 2025 remains the basis but the "thorniest issue" (territory) is unresolved. Zelensky said new discussions were expected but none materialized. With Witkoff and Kushner reassigned to Iran, there is nobody minding the Ukraine store.

What's the trajectory?

We rate Ukraine at 7.5/10 fucked, up from 7/10 in early March.

What got worse: Kursk collapsed completely. Fortress Belt offensive begun. Air defense crisis deepened by Middle East interceptor consumption. Peace talks frozen. Russia's oil windfall from the Iran war ($6.9 billion in two weeks).

What got better: Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive holding and expanding (435 square kilometers liberated). Starlink whitelist formalized. Russia's comms degraded. The drone-for-Patriot gambit working across 11 countries with teams deployed. Russia's Fortress Belt assaults suffering 81% casualty rates. Zelensky approval up to 62%. Ukraine achieving drone parity with Russia on long-range strikes for the first time. Fiber-optic FPV drones with new dual-channel control ($60 upgrade) scaling rapidly.

The war remains attritional. Neither side can achieve a breakthrough. Russia is closer to its manpower ceiling. Ukraine is closer to its air defense floor. The Iran war accelerated both clocks. And the man in the middle, Zelensky, at 62% approval, selling $1,000 drones to countries that can't fight without them, is playing the worst hand in international politics better than anyone expected.

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FAQ

Is the Kursk withdrawal a strategic failure?

Yes. The territory gained nothing durable: no Russian redeployment from Donbas, no negotiating leverage, no territorial bargaining chip. The occupation consumed resources that could have reinforced other fronts. The withdrawal was disorderly. The only lasting impact is tactical experience gained by Ukrainian forces in offensive operations, which is being applied to the Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive.

Can Ukraine survive without Patriot resupply?

At current Russian strike tempo (400+ drones per major wave), Ukraine's existing air defense cannot protect the country. IRIS-T and NASAMS handle medium-range threats effectively but cannot intercept ballistic missiles. The $1,000 interceptor drone fills the gap for cheap Iranian-origin drones but not for Iskanders or Oreshnik. Ukraine needs Patriots. The ME consumed 800+ in days. Lockheed makes 1.7 per day. The math doesn't work for both theaters simultaneously.

Is Russia winning?

Russia is advancing at catastrophic cost (81% casualty rate in the Fortress Belt assault) while its war economy runs on an Iran-driven oil windfall that extends its fiscal runway to end of 2027. It is gaining ground but losing people faster than it can replace them. If "winning" means capturing territory while hollowing out your demographic future and bankrupting your sovereign wealth fund, then yes. By any other definition, no.