Azerbaijan Is Shipping Russian Aid to the Country That Bombed It. The Transit Math Explains Why.

Three batches of Russian humanitarian aid to Iran have transited through Azerbaijan since March 12. The first: 29 tonnes of medicines by Il-76 aircraft. The second: 313 tonnes by rail in 31 wagons. The third: 140-150 tonnes of food by 7 trucks from Dagestan. Total: approximately 480 tonnes. Russian officials Popov and Melnik publicly thanked Azerbaijan. Araghchi thanked Azerbaijan on March 28.

Azerbaijan. The country that Iran hit with Arash-2 drones on March 5. The country whose president called it "an act of terror." The country that declared Combat Readiness No. 1.

That same country is the logistics corridor for Russia to resupply the country that attacked it. And there's a darker subtext: Western intelligence sources (FT, Washington Post) allege that Russia is simultaneously shipping upgraded Geran-2 drones alongside the "humanitarian" cargo. The Kremlin denies it. Azerbaijan facilitates transit without inspecting Russian sovereign shipments. Plausible deniability is the architecture.

Simultaneously, Azerbaijan transits Russian goods to Armenia: 23,000+ tons of wheat, 1,000 tons of fertilizers, 68 tons of buckwheat. Armenia. The country Azerbaijan fought a war with in 2020.

Aliyev's coercive diplomacy makes more sense when you follow the money. Every wagon that transits Azerbaijan pays transit fees. Every ton of Russian wheat that reaches Armenia via Azerbaijan instead of via Georgia or Iran generates revenue for Azerbaijani Railways. The transit corridor is a business, and Baku runs it like one.

Why does Azerbaijan transit Russian aid to Iran?

Three reasons, none of them emotional.

Geography. The north-south corridor (Russia to Iran through Azerbaijan) is the shortest overland route. The alternative routes (through Georgia to Turkey to Iran, or through the Caspian by ship) are slower and more expensive. Azerbaijan sits between Russia and Iran physically. Blocking transit would redirect trade through competitors.

Revenue. Transit fees are modest per wagon but add up. More importantly, being the indispensable corridor gives Azerbaijan political leverage with both Russia and Iran. You don't burn down a bridge you collect tolls on.

The Nakhchivan calculation. Azerbaijan's 460,000 residents in Nakhchivan depend on the Turkey-Iran border for access when flights are disrupted. Antagonizing Iran risks the 179 km Nakhchivan-Iran border becoming hostile. Facilitating Russian aid to Iran signals "we are not your enemy" more effectively than any diplomatic note.

Azerbaijan evacuated 3,040 people from Iran since February 28 (516 Azerbaijani, 723 Chinese, 343 Russian, citizens from 50+ countries including the Vatican and Belize). The evacuation corridor function and the transit corridor function serve the same purpose: positioning Azerbaijan as the reliable, neutral infrastructure provider that everyone needs, regardless of who bombed whom.

What does NATO think about all this?

NATO's 2025 Secretary General report (released this week) "welcomes significant progress on the path to peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia," citing the August peace agreement initialing as "an important step toward normalizing relations and strengthening regional security."

The report confirms that NATO cooperates with Azerbaijan through the Partnership for Peace program. The alliance describes the South Caucasus as "important for NATO's security, especially given that the region continues to feel the effects of Russia's war against Ukraine."

The framing is revealing. NATO sees the South Caucasus through the Ukraine lens (Russian influence, transit routes, energy security). Azerbaijan's transit of Russian goods, Russian aid to Iran, Russian wheat to Armenia: none of this triggers NATO concern because the transit corridor serves Western strategic interests too. The Middle Corridor and BTC pipeline are NATO-relevant infrastructure. Keeping Azerbaijan functional as a transit state serves everyone.

Hikmet Hajiyev's meeting with Hungary's security adviser (on the sidelines of the Organization of Turkic States) and Serbia's gas deal (increasing Azerbaijani supplies from 1.3M to 2M cubic meters daily) demonstrate the pattern. Azerbaijan collects the oil windfall, expands gas exports, transits Russian goods in all directions, and maintains relationships with every party. The green energy pivot (Aliyev opened the Absheron battery storage center this week) positions Azerbaijan for the post-fossil-fuel transit economy too.

A landmine injured a resident in Aghdam district (Karabakh) this week. The human cost of the 2020 war continues in the background while the transit trains roll.

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FAQ

Does Russia pay Azerbaijan for the transit?

Yes. Standard transit fees apply through Azerbaijani Railways (ADY). The specific per-wagon or per-ton rate is not public but is part of the broader Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran North-South Transport Corridor commercial framework. The revenue is modest compared to oil income but the political leverage of being indispensable is worth more than the fees.

Could Azerbaijan block Russian aid to Iran?

Legally, yes. Practically, it would damage Azerbaijan's relationship with both Russia and Iran simultaneously, with no corresponding benefit. Russia is Azerbaijan's second-largest trading partner. Iran shares a 765 km border. Blocking transit would push both countries toward alternative routes that bypass Azerbaijan entirely, reducing Baku's leverage. The transit function IS the leverage.

How does this affect the Armenia transit through Azerbaijan?

The 23,000+ tons of Russian wheat reaching Armenia via Azerbaijan demonstrates that the north-south corridor is bidirectional and commercially neutral. Azerbaijan transits goods to its former enemy (Armenia) and its recent attacker (Iran) because transit revenue and political leverage outweigh grudges. This pragmatism is what makes Azerbaijan's position the most rational of the war.