The US Is Building Georgia's Port While Banning Georgia From Every Decision That Matters

Peter Andreoli, a representative of the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, visited the Anaklia deep-sea port construction site on March 26. He was accompanied by Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Ioseliani and US Chargé d'Affaires Alan Purcell. They discussed the port's master plan, infrastructure development, and the railway component. Jan De Nul, the Belgian dredging giant that built Palm Island Dubai and the Panama Canal expansion, is doing the construction. A large dredger arrives in July 2026, with contractual completion set for May 14, 2027.

Andreoli also visited Poti port (meeting APM Terminals management) and met 5+ opposition leaders at the US Embassy. The dual-track visit: infrastructure with the government, democracy with the opposition.

This is the second time a State Department representative has visited Tbilisi in 2026. Vance skipped Georgia entirely during his February South Caucasus trip. Kobakhidze's letter to Trump went unanswered. Political cooperation between the US and Georgia is "effectively suspended" because of Georgian Dream's authoritarian turn. The EU has frozen Georgia's accession process. The Helsinki Commission says the ruling party is using the judiciary as a political tool, with opposition leaders now facing sentences of 7 to 15 years. NATO Secretary General Rutte called on Georgian authorities to "return to a pro-European and future-oriented path." The EU's four-party South Caucasus contact group pointedly excludes Georgia.

And yet. The State Department keeps visiting. Because Anaklia is not about Georgia's democracy. It's about the TRIPP corridor.

Why does the US care about Anaklia?

The Middle Corridor runs from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian to Baku, through Georgia to Turkey, and out to Europe. The TRIPP corridor connects Armenia to Turkey through Syunik, feeding into the same east-west route. Both corridors need a Black Sea port. Georgia has three: Batumi, Poti, and the planned Anaklia. Batumi and Poti are small. Anaklia, at planned capacity of 100 million tonnes, would be the largest port on the Black Sea's eastern coast.

The corridor doesn't work without a functioning port. The port doesn't work without the railway component (which Andreoli specifically discussed). The railway connects to the BTK (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars) line, which connects to the BTC pipeline route, which is the physical backbone of the entire east-west energy and trade architecture.

Washington's calculation is transparent: Georgia's democracy can be addressed later. The port cannot wait. The Iran war proved that every trade route running through Iran or Russia is vulnerable. The Middle Corridor through Georgia is the only alternative. If Georgia's port isn't built, the corridor has no exit. If the corridor has no exit, Armenia stays trapped. If Armenia stays trapped, TRIPP is vapor.

There's a deeper layer of absurdity. The Chinese consortium that won the Anaklia tender in May 2024 is CCCC (China Communications Construction Company), which has been OFAC-sanctioned since 2021 for military-industrial ties. No contract has been signed in nearly two years. The port is still in its preparatory phase: environmental permits pending, no breakwater yet, budget slashed from 150 million to 50 million GEL. Phase 1 capacity: approximately 600,000 TEU. Operational date: 2029 at the earliest.

A US-sanctioned Chinese company controls the development rights to a port that the US needs for its own corridor. The State Department tours the construction site anyway. The opposition leader Gvaramia says: "No Anaklia port, no route from the Caspian to the Black Sea through Georgia will happen while Ivanishvili is in power." The European Parliament voted 438-37 on March 12 demanding Khoshtaria's release. The contradiction is the policy.

What did Andreoli do besides visit the port?

He met with opposition leaders. The opposition says they discussed political prisoners and "the course." The dual-track approach mirrors the broader US posture: engage the infrastructure (which serves American strategic interests) while maintaining contact with the opposition (which serves American values rhetoric).

NATO's report from the same week reinforces the duality. Rutte described the South Caucasus as "strategically important," noted that the alliance "revised some components of cooperation" with Georgia over democracy concerns, but confirmed that "military cooperation continues." The alliance can condemn Georgia's politics and cooperate with its military simultaneously because the strategic geography doesn't change with the political weather.

The Khoshtaria case escalated while Andreoli was in town. The Helsinki Commission warned that opposition leaders now face 7-15 year sentences, up from the 18-month sentence that already drew European condemnation. European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper called it "disproportionate" and a "continuation of repression." The Swedish and Norwegian ambassadors issued separate statements of concern.

Ivanishvili's government doesn't care. It has Russia's protection, Chinese investment, Iranian transit revenue, and now, apparently, continued American interest in its port infrastructure. The democratic pressure from Brussels is rhetorical. The infrastructure interest from Washington is material. Tbilisi knows which one matters more.

What does this mean for the TRIPP corridor?

The corridor's weakest link is Georgia. Not because of capacity (Anaklia solves that) but because of politics. If Georgian Dream deepens its pro-Russian orientation, Western investment in Georgian corridor infrastructure could stall. The EU four-party group that excludes Georgia is a signal. If that exclusion becomes policy (no EU corridor funding for Georgia), Anaklia's development depends entirely on Chinese and Emirati investment, which comes with different political strings.

Pashinyan traveled to Sighnaghi on March 3-4 to assure Kobakhidze that TRIPP "is not an obstacle to transit through Georgia." The assurance was diplomatic. The reality is that every kilometer of TRIPP through Syunik is a kilometer of reduced Armenian dependence on Georgian transit. Georgia's leverage (87.5% of Armenian gas, 40% of trucks on Georgian highways) weakens with every TRIPP milestone.

The Andreoli visit is America telling Georgia: we need your port, but we're building alternatives to your transit monopoly. The port and the corridor are not the same leverage. Georgia can host the port and still lose the transit dominance that gives Tbilisi power over Yerevan.

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FAQ

Is Anaklia actually being built?

Yes. Jan De Nul (Belgium) is conducting the dredging and construction. A Chinese-led consortium won the development contract. Planned capacity is 100 million tonnes per year. Timeline is uncertain but physical construction is underway. The railway component (connecting Anaklia to the BTK line) is the bottleneck.

Why does the US keep engaging Georgia if relations are suspended?

Because infrastructure interests and democratic values operate on different timelines. Democracy pressure is long-term (years, elections, generational change). Port construction is immediate (if Anaklia isn't built now, the Middle Corridor has no exit for a decade). The US will accept an authoritarian government in Tbilisi if it gets a functioning Black Sea port for the east-west corridor.

Could Georgia block the TRIPP corridor?

Georgia controls the transit routes but not the corridor's logic. If Georgia blocks or complicates TRIPP, the US redirects investment to Turkish Mediterranean ports (Mersin, Iskenderun) that bypass Georgia entirely. The threat of irrelevance is Georgia's real constraint, not external pressure for democracy.